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Robert Paruzel 
Methods of forming cultural safety 
of nation states 
Theory
Culture is a collection of established and accumulated social formations that 
are capable of spatial expansion, connecting in the process strongly diverse 
groups of people who support their own language, beliefs, habits, knowledge, 
traditions, ideas and craving for making the reality of their own ideals of beauty, 
goodness and truth1. The division of the culture into material and immaterial2 
formation is a very conventional one as in the social reality the spirit and matter 
are always combined with each other. On the one hand – there is no religious 
belief without rites, i.e. without special gestures, body postures and activities 
related to material objects3. Regrettably, to this date any attempts at developing 
an explicit definition of culture, which would be satisfying for everyone, have 
been unsuccessful. As early as in the mid-20th century American sociologists, 
Clyde Kluckhohn and Alfred L. Kroeber distinguished 164 scholarly inclusions of 
the notion4. Therefore, like in the ancient times, it seems best to present culture 
by means of descriptive methods, such as: exercise, education, enhancement, 
 1 S. Czarnowski, Dzieła, vol. 1: Studia z historii kultury, Warszawa 1956, p. 23.
 2 Entry: Kultura, in: K. Olechnicki, P. Załęcki, Słownik socjologiczny, Toruń 1999, p. 106.
 3 S. Czarnowski, op. cit., p. 17.
 4 R. Bierstedt, The social order: an introduction to sociology, New York 1963, p. 129.
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maintenance, conservation, nurture of intellectual skills, character, spiritual 
values or moral principles, following the worship activities5.
Similar situation is with the issue of the cultural safety of a state, which, 
unlike typical threats – military, financial, commercial, legal, resource-related, 
health-related, etc. – is relatively vague in itself. It relates to the issue of identity 
of large social groups with the culture preferred by the political power centre that 
dominates in its territory. Cultural consolidation is an important task of state 
authorities at the time of peace – in the interest of their own legitimization and 
preventing separatist tendencies. It requires carrying out an effective long-term 
policy with that regard, often also by means of using violence. History shows 
us that when great empires were disintegrated, the lines of their breakup were 
convergent with the cultural and religious borders (the empires: Roman, Mongol, 
British, Spanish French, Portuguese, Dutch and Belgian overseas colonies). The 
clearest example of division of great states into smaller ones, with a historically 
formed national culture occurred in the case of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, 
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia6.
Human history over the centuries is the evolution from a community living 
in hordes to individuals acting within the systems of modern states. A human 
being has almost always been perceived as gregarious. Aristotle defined it as 
a political animal, Karl Marx saw it as the resultant of the “totality of social 
relations”, Elliot Aronson described man as a “social animal”, while Gernot 
Böhme concluded that the basic determinant of human existence is our natural 
tendency to live in a community7. It is religion that strongly consolidates the 
state and other political organizations. It is usually present at a transnational 
level – just like the national culture – creating the community of values, norms 
and models of conduct. The religious conflicts of the past, as far as they were 
something more than just the grounds for an interference with the affairs of 
other countries and their governments, in fact took place not to resolve which 
confession is superior, but to strengthen own security of state authority and 
dynastic interests. The uniformness of culture and religion of a specific state 
determines the gods, patrons, dogmas, ceremonies and forms of worship, while 
the order constituted by this unity reaches as far as it altars. Anything beyond 
 5 Entry: Kultura, in: J. Korpanty (ed.), Słownik łacińsko-polski, Warszawa 2003, p. 423.
 6 S.P. Huntington, Zderzenie cywilizacji i nowy kształt ładu światowego, transl. H. Jan-
kowska, Warszawa 2011, p. 223.
 7 G. Böhme, Antropologia filozoficzna: ujęcie pragmatyczne, transl. P. Domański, War-
szawa 1998, p. 118.
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and outside thus marked area is profane, barbarian, alien, maybe also hostile?8 
Countries with similar values approach one another with friendliness. Mutual 
acceptance of similarities connects groups of countries and nations into vast 
civilizations9.
As early as in the antiquity a belief was developed that a “civilized person” 
is an individual that is “cultured”, striving for living with others in harmony. 
A “barbarian” on the other hand, is anyone who lives outside the borders of the 
Greek and Roman civilization, has their own culture, religion, some value system, 
own customs and knowledge10, but is bellicose and particularly hostile towards 
others11. In the etiological meaning12, civilized people are the responsible citizens 
of a state. The attitudes they display distinguish them positively in the world13 
and therefore they attribute low value to the qualities presented by the barba-
rians. The descriptions of barbaric peoples that the civilized citizens of Rome 
have left us leave no doubt: The Saxons are cruel, the Franks – treacherous, the 
Gepids – inhuman, the Huns – ignoble, etc.14 “We know who we are only when 
we know who we are not and often only when we know whom we are against”15.
Affiliation and active participation in a specific culture or civilization are 
equal with adoption of their individual features as one’s own. Identity or same-
ness of behavior and established beliefs induce people to identify with their 
own meticulously cherished vernacular which gives the feeling of identity to 
a community16. The feeling of dissimilarity from the “barbarians” also stems 
from tradition and historical memory. If an ethnic myth clearly maps a territory 
from which the community concerned originates, then its symmetrical comple-
ment is the common anticipation of the future17. As the meaning of a national 
 8 J.J. Rousseau, O religii społecznej, in: idem, Umowa społeczna, transl. A. Peretiatkowicz, 
Kęty 2007, p. 98–106.
 9 S.P. Huntington, op. cit., p. 59.
 10 E. Sapir, Kultura, język, osobowość, transl. B. Stanosz, R. Zimand, Warszawa 1978, p. 172.
 11 J. Ortega y Gasset, Bunt mas i inne pisma socjologiczne, transl. P. Niklewicz, H. Woź-
niakowski, Warszawa 1982, p. 54.
 12 Z. Chlewiński, Etologia, in: A. Maryniarczyk et al. (eds.), Powszechna encyklopedia 
filozofii, vol. 3: Me–Pań, Lublin 2006, p. 252.
 13 E. Sapir, op. cit., p. 175.
 14 J. Le Goff, Kultura średniowiecznej Europy, transl. H. Szumańska-Grossowa, Gdańsk 
– Warszawa 2002, p. 28–29.
 15 S.P. Huntington, op. cit., p. 18.
 16 G. Michałowska, Zmienność i instytucjonalizacja międzynarodowych stosunków kul-
turalnych, Warszawa 1991, p. 280.
 17 L. Kołakowski, O tożsamości narodowej, in: K. Michalski (ed.), Tożsamość w czasach 
zmiany. Rozmowy w Castel Gandolfo, Kraków – Warszawa 1995, p. 48.
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culture we understand the general collection of spiritual and intellectual values 
as well as material products of a community concerned18 – the repository which 
includes norms and beliefs, historical sources and works of art. Those are recor-
ded, retained and regarded by the nation as their own, decide on the people’s 
separateness, strengthen the feeling of internal bond and identity. The latter 
one is a resultant of many elements. The national spirit (Volksgeist) shapes every 
state according to unique principles, however the historical experience shows 
that it is the war that makes the affairs of the state closer to its citizens19. Some 
even claim that a war is an integral part of the world order as given to people 
by God. It is during the war that the noblest human virtues are formed: courage, 
selflessness, inclination to sacrifice, sense of duty and fidelity to the ruler or the 
state, not refraining to go as far as scarifying one’s life20.
The national spirit imbuing the population of the state in which everyone 
has a bigger or smaller share in exercising power, gives an individual character 
to the state’s virtues and vices. Action expressed in the same words will look 
different when performed by a Spanish person and by a French citizen. For Hans 
Morgenthau this is a unique truth that exhibits existence of basic differences 
between nations. It affects their relative greatness or mediocrity. Everything 
by what they stand as nations composed from subsequent generations is the 
result of that spirit’s work21.
The first states were established on the territories constituted of various 
communities or ethnic groups and “local” nations who naturally, due to their 
difference were always ready to separate from the centre of domination within 
the area they found themselves in. Creating a community that is perceived 
by everybody as a common wealth, which allows the authorities to rule in 
a steady manner, is significantly more effective and economical in execution 
than keeping atomized cultural groups obedient with the use of violence. In 
a situation when a state becomes weaker as a result of natural disasters or wars, 
any communities that are not connected with it – in their own interest – are 
inclined to secede or actively cooperate with a foreign state. The attacking state 
always tends to offer the minorities more advantageous conditions for existence 
 18 J. Pruszyński, Dziedzictwo kultury Polski: jego straty i ochrona prawna, vol. 1, Kraków 
2001, p. 62.
 19 T. Kroński, Hegel i jego filozofia dziejów, in: G.W.F. Hegel, Wykłady z filozofii dziejów, 
vol. 1, transl. J. Grabowski, A. Landman, Warszawa 1958, p. XXVI–XXVII.
 20 A.J. Toynbee, Wojna i cywilizacja, transl. T. Dehnel, Warszawa 2002, p. 24.
 21 H.J. Morgenthau, K.W. Thompson, Polityka między narodami. Walka o potęgę i pokój, 
transl. R. Włoch, Warszawa 2010, p. 153.
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and development. After victory, just like its predecessors, but in a definitely 
more effective way, the aggressor will be striving using all available methods 
to liquidate any foreign culture that somebody else could use against them in 
the future. It was in the leaders’ interest – first in relation to the elites, and then 
towards other subsequently liberating themselves social groups – to instill in 
them the standards of identification strengthening the common state affiliation. 
It must be remembered that each machinery of state and the based on it political, 
legal and social order are always a necessary and inalienable legitimation of the 
leaders. In order to protect a monarchy, a tyranny or a democracy from a sudden 
change of the present public order, its unsettlement or even abolishing, the 
authority of the state must retain the right of monopoly to use physical violence 
sanctioned by law22. Plato presented it in the following way: if a “lord” happened 
to be in a desert with his slaves and wealth, in a place with no state, it would 
only last a short time for him to enjoy those possessions, as well as his own life23.
Legends and myths uniting the feeling of community can be justifiably called 
“pre-historic narrations”. They develop in societies who do not know historical 
records or historical continuity. They are the very heart of the culture24 of the pre- 
or non-historical societies. Such a consolidating narrative can be the founding 
myth telling a story of a large family and a common ancestor – a forefather or 
a first mother, founders or “patrons” of real and imagined communities. The 
examples are the Babylonian Gilgamesh, Hebrew Abraham, Chinese Fu-hsi, 
Manu of Hinduism, Minos of Crete, Roman Romulus, English King Arthur 
and Polish Lech25. The consolidating narrative can also concern events that 
may not necessarily be historical – which is insignificant – what is important 
is the fact that the legend, the story, oral message, all of them are the driving 
force for the community, it is the active integrating factor. At the same time it 
prepares the society to “defend our borders” or produces “warriors”26. A very 
interesting dual split occurs here. The living example of a Polish scout song from 
 22 M. Weber, Polityka jako zawód i powołanie, transl. A. Kopacki, P. Dybel, Kraków – 
Warszawa 1998, p. 56.
 23 B. Szacka, Wprowadzenie do socjologii, Warszawa 2003, p. 400.
 24 W.J. Burszta, Antropologia kultury: tematy, teorie, interpretacje, Poznań 1998, p. 101–120.
 25 F. Znaniecki, Nauki o kulturze: narodziny i rozwój, transl. J. Szacki, Warszawa 1992, 
p. 31.
 26 The author describes very lively liaisons between the folklore being the “voice of the 
people” and the “political myth” which was executed by the Serbian nationalists during 
the last Balkan war; see. I. Čolović, Polityka symboli: eseje o antropologii politycznej, 
transl. M. Petryńska, Kraków 2001, p. 19, 61.
30
the interwar period, shows us how the national sense of the citizens of a young 
state was constructed on the ground of references to a vague, mythical tribal 
community. Through a huge hyperbole a transfer takes place from the tribal 
world into the world of modern states with all of their discourses or vice versa. 
In any case one must bear in mind that the modern “tribal” discourse is the 
establishing foundation of modern national states. We can regard the fictional 
tribal narrative as an element of the foundation discourse of national states27, 
while the “stateless” nations will incline more towards eternal return, to their 
“King in the Mountain”. Anyway, we always deal with warriors, knights, arms. 
Attention should also be drawn to the fact that the basic identity narratives are 
usually “military” which is not equivalent with aggressive. In national states 
the authority popularized mass education which by assumption was to develop 
future “perfect adults”. It is not difficult to guess that the curriculum was directly 
or indirectly developed by the ruling elite so that it reproduced the “correct” 
model of the world, the scope of knowledge as well as obedience and sense of 
duty towards the state. From this point of view the modern system of education 
was a factory of “modern citizens”28.
As it was mentioned before, the role of the state in the process of developing 
nations consists in merging fragmented communities and ethnic minorities 
into a creation granted with a sense of common identity. It can take a form of 
a positive nationalism that becomes a real and “tangible” concept in the everyday 
life of a community in question29, which to some extent protects the state from 
the chaos of internationalization30.
Methods of consolidation of a national state
Gradual driving away of the sense of identity: tribal, ethnic, religious and natio-
nal in case of immigrant minorities and those joining the composition of a wider 
organism has been an important element of the cultural policy of a state. Starting 
from the ancient times, the people included into Egypt, Babylon, Tsardom of 
Russia, the United States and Reich until 1945, at the desire of the rulers fearing 
 27 F. Znaniecki, Nauki o kulturze, p. 149.
 28 É. Durkheim, Zasady metody socjologicznej, transl. J. Szacki, Warszawa 2000, p. 70.
 29 W.J. Burszta, op. cit., p. 21.
 30 F. Gołembski, Współpraca kulturalna w procesie budowy europejskiego ładu pokojowego, 
Warszawa 1979, p. 43.
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secession – especially national uprisings – on principle lost their identity for 
the benefit of the national cultures that were predominant in those countries. 
A Germanized or Russified Pole, Czech, Ukrainian or a Byelorussian is a citizen 
that is very useful for the partitioning countries. He is willing to support the 
state’s security policy at the same time reducing the costs of forcible mainta-
ining of internal order in new provinces. Intensification of the Germanization 
in the Prussian Partition was directly proportional to the sense of threat with 
the province’s secession. The Reich Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck was afraid 
that if Poland revives in the territories located to east of Oder, then Prussia will 
perish. Personally he had a lot of consideration for the Polish people but he 
made no bones about one thing: if we don’t wipe them out, then we ourselves 
won’t be able to exist safely. And so it happened: on 25 February 1947 the Allied 
Control Council for Germany (Alliierte Kontrollrat), with the decision no. 46 
dissolved the Prussian state as a political entity. It decided that it was not only 
the Prussians themselves but also their aggressive “national spirit” to blame for 
unleashing the two subsequent world wars31.
A lot had been written about the Aryan race and its calling to rule the world 
in the millennium-old German Reich. The conclusion of it all is a common 
knowledge. The policy of the Reich is only worth mentioning at this point, 
concerning German minorities after 1918 which had led to plebiscites, cease-
less complaints, press campaigns and litigations at the League of Nations. It 
was obvious for everyone that the policy of Berlin in relation to its minorities 
serves the destabilization of the states in which they live. All those actions were 
conducted in the Czechoslovakia Sudetenland, Lithuanian Memel and in the 
territories of the Second Polish Republic. The problem of German minorities in 
Europe is regarded one of the most significant reasons for the outbreak of the 
World War II32. The fundamental premise of the Nazi national policy that was 
consistently implemented in the occupied territories was Adolf Hitler’s aspira-
tion that all Germans lived on a single integrated territory. The existing popu-
lation was to be completely Germanized. The allied forces’ decision executed 
after the war can be called the justice of the fate or its irony. In order to prevent 
future conflicts with German minorities, a decision was taken to displace all the 
 31 S. Salmonowicz, Prusy: dzieje państwa i społeczeństwa, Warszawa 2004, p. 476.
 32 W. Dobrzycki, Historia stosunków międzynarodowych w czasach nowożytnych 1815–1945, 
Warszawa 1996, p. 428, 438, 439, 441.
32
Germans from the Central, Eastern and Southern Europe into a territory that 
was significantly smaller than the leader of the Nazi Germany had assumed33.
A lot had also been written about the cultural policy of Russia. The inferiority 
prevailing among the Russian power elites, mainly in the view of the material 
achievements of the Western countries and of the Far East, has been effectively 
balanced by the very rich spiritual culture of this country, and especially by the 
myth of the sense of historical mission, as sustained by the elite. This myth has 
almost always been the enduring element of the strategic culture of Russia. Since 
the adoption of Christianity, the idea of the Third Rome and New Jerusalem 
untainted by the western heresies settled well in Moscow34. After the October 
Revolution the myths of Moscow as the Third Rome and Holy Rus have endu-
red, however in an altered form. A view has spread out that it is only the Soviet 
Russia that implements and retains in the purest form the truth of Marxism that 
necessarily “must” be spread in the world35. The religious values were replaced 
with dialectical materialism36. If the defense of the Orthodox Christianity and 
the Slavic could no longer be the tool that justified subordinating new territories 
to Kremlin, then the state that emerged on the ruins of the Russian Empire 
based its strategic policy on the universal doctrine of communism, which – in 
its time – could make that expansion quite realistic37. The paternalistic model of 
the authority of state personized by the tsar is still deeply rooted in the Russian 
culture. The strong submission of the will of the public to the will of an individual 
had been determined by the collectivistic model of conduct, long before the 
Revolution. The Russians have always criticized egotism, opposing the western 
“I” with “us” or “we”: the Orthodox Church, nation and local community. After 
the Revolution the same way defined “us” – as the working class, and later the 
state – the soviet nation. Elevating the collective “us” has always resulted in 
totalitarianism38. Just like centuries ago, President Vladimir Putin, eager to 
reconstruct the tsar and soviet empire, intends to geographically turn away all 
threats from its centre, or Moscow. When swallowing up the neighboring states, 
 33 R. Paruzel, Problem mniejszości niemieckiej w stosunkach polsko-niemieckich w latach 
1945–1999, praca doktorska, Warszawa 2001, p. 95–141.
 34 W. Peltz, Suwerenność państwa w praktyce i doktrynie politycznej Rusi Moskiewskiej 
(XIV–XVI w.), Zielona Góra 1994, p. 226.
 35 R. Paradowski, Eurazjatyckie imperium Rosji: studium idei, Toruń 2001, p. 263.
 36 M. Bierdiajew, Rosyjska idea, transl. J.C.–S.W., Warszawa 1999, p. 14.
 37 M. Czajkowski, Rosja w Europie, Kraków 2005, p. 16–23; A.J. Toynbee, Cywilizacja 
w czasie próby, transl. W. Madej, Warszawa 1991, p. 114–126.
 38 A. Czajowski, Demokratyzacja Rosji w latach 1987–1999, Wrocław 2001, p. 42.
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Russia has always tried to Russify them and make them similar to itself so that 
they would have always remained on the Russia’s side. The deeply embedded 
in the Russian culture attitude of absolute obedience to its leaders has also 
remained unchanged in time. The Byzantine standards require to treat the 
Kremlin rulers in a special way. Since they perform their duties by God’s will, 
then in a way they become more like Him. This is the reason why any foreign 
ruler, needless to say, a foreign subject must not criticize them because it does 
not become to do so to the King of the kings39.
The best example of a modern and very vital legend about themselves is the 
commonly shared belief of the citizens of the United States of America that they 
have been chosen by God to lead and educate other nations with regard to justice 
and law40. In the Manifest destiny published in press, Americans found out about 
their mission to bring civilization to the benighted regions of the globe, and even 
to reign over the wild and ignorant nations for their well-being. The steadfast 
conviction of the elites and of the American society makes them believe that 
if their own political system is the best in the world, then it should be spread 
everywhere – even against the will of the peoples in question. All the nations in 
the world should necessarily be presented with the gifts of freedom, democracy, 
education, Christianity, etc. Failure to implement the abovementioned values 
was justified by the excuse that the non-white peoples are not capable of ruling 
for themselves and it is this very sense of mission that is the cause for doing it 
for them. The problem is that to this day armed interventions are carried out 
under very similar ideas. In the name of the abovementioned values America’s 
armed forces fought against Great Britain, Mexico, Spain, Germany, communist 
Korea, Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan41. An exceptionally gladly used reason 
that weakens the internal cultural integrity of the opponent is the pressure 
concerning the issue of respecting human rights. Apart from Japan and South 
Korea, countries outside of the “western civilization” have big problems with 
that. Practical implementation of those values, especially in Afghanistan and 
other Muslim countries will probably take many years. The social and political 
tradition of those countries is completely different. For instance the Confucian 
ethos to which many Asian countries have adhered for more than two millennia, 
 39 B.A. Uspienski, W.M. Żywow, Car i Bóg. Semiotyczne aspekty sakralizacji monarchy 
w Rosji, transl. H. Paprocki, Warszawa 1992, p. 14–15.
 40 S.P. Huntington, op. cit., p. 100.
 41 Z. Brzeziński, Strategiczna wizja. Ameryka a kryzys globalnej potęgi, transl. K. Sko-
nieczny, Kraków 2013, p. 94.
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is not always in line with the values of the Western world42. Human rights 
that are not properly respected in China, are sometimes the subject-matter of 
a dispute and purposeful manipulation on an international scale. It is not the 
case however with Saudi Arabia who is on friendly terms with the USA. There 
are many similar examples, which is why the view on double moral standards 
used by Americans seems justified43.
This problem was most visible at the time when the United Stated were 
formed at the beginning. In accordance with the principles constituting the 
American nation, it significantly increased the territory it occupied, in a very 
short time. The first settlers who came to Virginia did not land on pristine 
areas, but on a region inhabited by more than one hundred thousand Indians, 
and taking their land from them almost always involved violence. As a result of 
their constant pushing westward and placing in reserves, the native Americans 
have been physically ruined. Reserves and hunting grounds of the indigenous 
people were liquidated when the number of the settlers increased so much that 
there was too little land for the “whites”. Then the local politicians would send 
petitions to Washington with a request to remove native Americans for the 
“road of civilization”44. The conflict between those communities was unavoidable 
as 90 percent of the English settlers were farmers and the Indian territories 
constrained their development45. Force and exploitation were used towards 
them46. As many as 12 million native Americans lost their lives as a result of 
ethnic cleansing in the USA and Canada alone. The number is from 68 to 90 
million for the whole Western Hemisphere47. It has been the biggest genocide 
in the history of the world to date48. The main impact on the extermination of 
Indians was from the contagious diseases, famine and persecution.
After the expansion on their own continent, it was necessary to present 
to its democratic public opinion an important reason why the United States 
should conquer further territories. A bizarre justification for the worldwide 
 42 S.P. Huntington, op. cit., p. 386.
 43 Ibidem, p. 309.
 44 J. Wojtczak, Sand Creek 1864, Warszawa 2007, p. 46.
 45 B.W. Sheehan, I. Wawrzyczek (eds.), Historia Stanów Zjednoczonych Ameryki, vol. 2: 
1763–1848, Warszawa 1995, p. 233.
 46 G.B. Tindall, D.E. Shi, Historia Stanów Zjednoczonych, transl. A. Bartkowicz, H. Jan-
kowska, J. Ruszkowski, Poznań 2002, p. 79.
 47 R. Horsman, Race and manifest destiny. The origins of American racial Anglo-Saxonism, 
Cambridge 1981, p. 44.
 48 M. Mann, The dark side of democracy. Explaining ethnic cleansing, Cambridge 2006, p. 
70–110.
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leadership of the American White Anglo-Saxon Protestants (WASP)49 was the 
belief, disseminated by the elites of that state about their own racial superiority 
to all other nations. The major propagators of that idea include: Alfred T. Mahan, 
Frederick J. Tuner, Theodore Roosevelt and Henry C. Lodge50. Modern analysis 
of those viewpoints leaves no doubt that they were but a mere propaganda tool 
covering the greed and imperious aspirations51. Practical application of this idea 
occurred after taking over the Philippines from Spain in 1899. At that point 
Americans started their rule from murdering more than three thousand resi-
dents of Manila, who refused to become a colony of the USA. Chicago Tribune 
wrote then that “[t]he entire American population justifies the conduct of its 
army at Manila because only by a crushing repulse of the Filipinos could our 
position be made secure. […] We are […] the trustees of civilization and peace 
throughout the islands”. The commander-in-chief of the USA army, General 
Arthur MacArthur considered national guerrilla warfare as contradictory to 
wartime customs. He tolerated executing by fire squads and torturing priso-
ners52. Journalists commented it as follows: “There is no question that our men 
do ‘shoot niggers’ somewhat in the sporting spirit, but that is because war and 
their environments have rubbed off the thin veneer of civilization”53. During 
fights on the Samar Island General Jacob H. Smith instructed his troops to kill 
off the entire island’s population capable of carrying guns and ordered: “I want 
no prisoners. I wish you to kill and burn, the more you kill and burn the bet-
ter it will please me”. Upon his return home, cheering crowds treated him as 
a national hero. In response to the news of a court-martial threat, his medical 
officer made a following statement: “It makes me sick to see what has been said 
about him. If people knew what a thieving, treacherous, worthless bunch of 
scoundrels those Filipinos are, they would think differently than they do now. 
You can’t treat them the way you do civilized folks”54.
 49 H. Kubiak, Rodowód narodu amerykańskiego, Kraków 1975, p. 21, 169.
 50 A. Bartnicki, K. Michałek, I. Rusinowa, Encyklopedia historii Stanów Zjednoczonych 
Ameryki Północnej: dzieje polityczne (od Deklaracji Niepodległości do współczesności), 
Warszawa 1992, p. 90, 222.
 51 D.E. Stannard, American holocaust: the conquest of the New World, Oxford 1992, p. 
134–138, 268. 
 52 G. Regan, Największe błędy militarne w historii wojen, transl. T. Prochenka, Warszawa 
2006, p. 113.
 53 S.C. Miller, Benevolent assimilation: the American conquest of the Philippines, 1899–1903, 
New Haven 1984, p. 107.
 54 Ibidem, p. 118.
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There were empires in the world, which right from their rise had always 
been aware of the fact that they would never be able to impose their culture 
on other countries. This issue concerned ancient Persia and the British Empire 
that certainly learnt their lesson from the experience of their predecessor. In 
the provinces the Persians captured, they retained the existing rulers whose 
power was constrained by recognizing the superiority of the Persian king and 
establishing a Persian satrap in their county. In addition, in order to verify the 
degree of loyalty of all the authorities of the subject province, the royal services 
placed incognito inspectors there (literally gauska – the eavesdropping). That 
allowed to undertake appropriate actions, e.g. send troops to the areas where 
rebellion was only starting to crystallize55. The British colonial policy was very 
pragmatic. It resulted directly from the limited capacities of that state whose 
prime objective was the collection of taxes. Different standards were applied to 
the Irish and Boers. To ensure security in the areas that should remain English 
forever, mass displacement was applied, not sparing civilians. During the Boer 
wars women, children and elderly were imprisoned in the first concentration 
camps in history. Almost a quarter of the prisoners: 27 thousand people died 
of diseases and starvation56. In other places, like in the Persian empire, the 
existing rulers were allowed to stay (as vice-kings) – under the condition that 
they recognize the superiority of the British Crown. The Empire was locally 
represented by a governor. Depending on the location and possibilities, the 
colonies were divided into royal (with own charters of liberties) and private57.
Political spectacles strengthening the feeling of 
community between the rulers and the subjects
In order to strengthen the authority of the state, for centuries the rulers proper 
for a specific era orchestrated carefully devised political shows58. It is enough 
to mention the Roman triumphs, Baroque courtly celebrations, which were in 
fact stunning theatrical performances, or today’s media spectacles prepared 
 55 G. Górski, S. Salmonowicz, Historia ustrojów państw, Warszawa 2001, p. 28–29.
 56 A.J. Kamiński, Koszmar niewolnictwa. Obozy koncentracyjne od 1896 do dziś: analiza, 
Warszawa 1990, p. 28–31.
 57 G. Górski, S. Salmonowicz, op. cit., p. 410–412.
 58 A. Rycman, Rytuał jako sposób budowania rzeczywistości politycznej, in: J. Wódz (ed.), 
Między socjologią polityki a antropologią polityki, Katowice 2009, p. 69–82.
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to the commission of the authorities by the biggest PR agencies59. Ceremonies, 
formalities, the entire decorum of the modern-era authorities – all those largely 
stem from religious ceremonial: both there and here symbols blend the image 
of the world into unity, even just for a moment, bringing into existence the 
order anticipated in it60. In both cases the obligatory standards include loftiness, 
severity, sublimity and the distance necessary to emphasize the power of the 
authority: shortly a form that evokes humility in those watching the spectacle. 
The most characteristic symbols that enhanced authority in the past were crowns 
(papal, emperor’s, royal and prince’s). They used to be the synonyms of sacrality 
and superiority of the ruler who should become the object of cult for his subjects. 
The scepter in his hands symbolized power over the army. When he sat on the 
throne, he was physically taller than all the people standing or kneeling before 
him. An eagle in the national emblem is to this day the most popular political 
symbol. As early as ancient Rome, the symbol of an eagle or Aquila was carried 
in front of every legion. It symbolizes great strength, bravery, exquisiteness, but 
also relentless cruelty resulting from its animal nature61. A sword in the hands 
of a ruler linked earth with the sky. All the spectacles were accompanied by 
apotheosis, or the feeling of the highest degree of glory that can be gained by 
a mortal receiving homage when exercising authority over individuals like him62.
From the anthropologic point of view, any political spectacles63 fulfill three 
essential functions. The first one is integrative in nature. According to Émile 
Durkheim, the rules of the ritual and allocated roles enhance social bounds. 
They consolidate the existing order, generate mass acceptance of political games. 
Participation of the head of state in religious and state services always has a cha-
racter of a perfectly arranged ceremony – the purpose of the decorum of the 
authority is to communicate existence of some kind of sacrum unavailable to 
an every mortal. Each element of the show of authority has a specific symbolic 
meaning, generates the impression of continuity and power: is a peculiar liturgy 
in a secular rite. State shows performed within a strictly determined political 
space are only comprehensible through their context, never – as it seems – in 
 59 K. Dojwa, M. Bodziany, Public relations instytucji bezpieczeństwa, Wrocław 2013, 
p. 17–24.
 60 A. Kuper, Kultura. Model antropologiczny, transl. I. Kołbon, Kraków 2005, p. 87.
 61 E. Razin, Historia sztuki wojennej, vol. 1: Sztuka wojenna okresu niewolniczego, transl. 
I. Bukowski, Warszawa 1958, p. 328.
 62 P. Rapelli, Symbole władzy i wielkie dynastie, transl. A. Wieczorek-Niebielska, Warszawa 
2008, p. 22, 28, 34, 40, 44, 48, 52, 60, 64, 68.
 63 A. Rycman, op. cit., p. 76.
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a direct reception. They certainly give their participant a feeling of bond64. Let 
us repeat: political rituals are ceremonies sanctifying an imagined community, 
as Benedict Anderson called a nation. Honoring the flag and the national coat 
of arms, assigning emblems to the key events in the national history, worship 
of national heroes, celebrating important historical anniversaries – all that 
constitutes a specific political religion65. The second function of the politi-
cal shows is the legitimization of authority. National ceremonies manifesting 
excellent condition of the contemporary monarchs resemble to great extent 
the ceremonies held on the occasion of for example Joseph Stalin’s or Kim Il 
Sung’s birthday. Personality cult is not only associated with totalitarianism. It 
equally also relates to the contemporary “political and cultural celebrities”. By 
assumption it should lead to the conviction of the extraordinariness of the 
authority or the actors whose image is “not from this world”. One could say that 
as long as in the past they had been identified as the “anointed ones”, today they 
are one of the ways to keep the masses in a devout awe66. The third function is 
distinctive in nature. It is to remind us of the “natural” asymmetry between the 
ruling and the ruled, showing this asymmetry as inevitable and undisputable 
(being something granted, by the succession rights, etc.). It clearly tells apart 
the dominant from the dominated. Each and every of the actors in the spectacle 
has an assigned function and position. The distinctive function prejudges the 
position of an individual in the rigid social hierarchy. In this case we can talk 
about “predetermined” authority.
There exists an important, if not the more important instrument for the 
reproduction of the existing order – namely internalization of authority. It 
stands for the process of “absorbing” authority by the dominated unit, which 
in a way starts to become a “porter of power” and executes a self-censorship, 
refrains from protests, contestation, rebellion: accepting the existing order. Let 
us distinguish three sources of internalization. The first one is the belief that 
“it has always been this way” and that the existing condition is sanctioned with 
tradition with which the dominated individual strongly identifies themselves. 
The second one is the belief in extraordinary features of the “good” leader, which 
occurs when an individual counts on better life secured by the leader and that 
they will safely lead them into the future. This belief makes it possible for people 
 64 É. Durkheim, Elementarne formy życia religijnego: system totemiczny, transl. A. Zadro-
żyńska, Warszawa 1990, p. 41.
 65 A. Rycman, op. cit., p. 73.
 66 F. Znaniecki, Nauki o kulturze, p. 40.
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to see outstanding features in an even uncharismatic leader. The third source is 
related to the legal and rational argumentation. The truth is that a ruled person 
persuades themselves that any objection, violation of the social rules in force 
is harmful for the entire community and can cause more harm than good67.
Contemporary threats to the cultural safety of countries
With few exceptions, most countries have always been open to external influence, 
which significantly contributes to their cultural development. The possibility to 
use the experience of other nations is dynamic in nature and is associated with 
slow evolution, adding on consistent elements, incorporation of ideas that are 
possible to be integrated into own system of values68. Today the biggest threat 
for the certainty of subsisting of a specific society, i.e. retaining its identity 
and religion, is the global mass culture, perceived as a foreign and destructive 
element69. In Nineteen eighty-four (1949), George Orwell presented his vision 
of how a mass transmission of information can become a perfect tool to influ-
ence a society in order to incapacitate and build a totalitarian system. Walter 
Benjamin endeavored to see a positive role of mass culture which could carry 
progressive political practices, however in reality the owners of the mass media 
used celebrities to strengthen the repressiveness of the political regimes. As 
long as the film capital is the driving force of the works of art, this will lead 
to changing the art of film into a commodity, and the consolidated worship of 
“stars” will not bring anything new into the art, instead just multiplying common 
stereotypes about it70.
Mass culture is a secondary product of the industrial revolution, indu-
strialization and urbanization. The process of creation of its work is called 
commercial production, directed to suit the demand of the general public. 
Antonina Kłoskowska maintains that the mass culture, currently called popular 
or pop culture, undoubtedly constitutes some kind of humanism, as it deals 
with discussing human issues, spreading common ethical values and models 
 67 M. Weber, op. cit., p. 78.
 68 G. Michałowska, Bezpieczeństwo kulturowe w warunkach globalizacji procesów spo-
łecznych, in: D.B. Bobrow, E. Haliżak, R. Zięba (eds.), Bezpieczeństwo narodowe i mię-
dzynarodowe u schyłku XX wieku, Warszawa 1997, p. 131.
 69 A. Włodkowska, Bezpieczeństwo kulturowe, w: K.A. Wojtaszczyk, A. Materska-Sosnow-
ska (eds.), Bezpieczeństwo państwa: wybrane problemy, Warszawa 2009, p. 149.
 70 W. Benjamin, Twórca jako wytwórca, transl. H. Orłowski, J. Sikorski, Poznań 1975, p. 82.
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of behavior, works of high culture boosting social integration of the audience 
dispersed in space. Thanks to its simplicity it does not require any effort form 
the recipient and allows to relieve stress. From the heights of intellectual criti-
cism such a type of humanism seems to be a parody as well as disfiguration and 
distortion of a deep idea. Mass culture is currently criticized for the fact that 
it restrains the direct contact of the creator with the recipient71. To make the 
reception easier, written word is departed from for the benefit of images and 
spoken word72. Commenting the current events, it suppresses an accurate public 
debate, transforming it into a staged show, its content is lowly, its form is dull, 
its interests are trivial, it is brutal, intrusive, expansive, disturbs people’s lives73.
In a situation when a nation is dazzled by a never stopping stream of 
entertainment and the discussion about its public interests starts to resemble 
a vaudeville, or a farce with music, it is in a serious jeopardy, as its culture and 
tradition start to perish74. As a result of opening to foreign influence, the cultural 
threats are not homogeneous in nature – especially in the spiritual and symbolic 
field75. When writing about the cultural safety of a nation, Jan Czaja points out 
that an uncontrolled inflow of mass culture leads to affirmation of the culture 
of death, mass migration, crisis of values, disintegration of traditional social 
structures76. The best fuel for this culture is the same matter that gives impetus 
to a neighbor gossip and is suitable for tabloid journalism. UNESCO spoke in 
1965 on behalf of the international community, defending the diversity of cul-
tures, adopting a convention which explicitly states that “[c]ulture constitutes 
a fundamental dimension of the development process and helps to strengthen 
the independence, sovereignty and identity of nations”. It further says: “Every 
culture represents a unique and irreplaceable body of values since each people’s 
traditions and forms of expression are its most effective means of demonstrating 
its presence in the world”77. The organization resolved that the protection of 
the diversity of cultures is one of the most important features of contemporary 
 71 P.T. Nowakowski, Fast food dla mózgu, czyli telewizja i okolice, Tychy 2002, p. 30.
 72 Idem, Środowisko słowa a środowisko obrazu w mediach. Aspekt pedagogiczny, in: P. 
Drzyzga (ed.), Nowe media a tradycyjne środki przekazu, Tychy 2007, p. 30–31.
 73 A. Kłoskowska, Kultura masowa: krytyka i obrona, Warszawa 2005, p. 280–309.
 74 N. Postman, Zabawić się na śmierć: dyskurs publiczny w epoce show-businessu, transl. 
L. Niedzielski, Warszawa 2002, p. 220.
 75 J. Czaja, Ochrona kultury narodowej, in: R. Jakubczak, J. Flis (eds.), Bezpieczeństwo 
narodowe Polski w XXI wieku: wyzwania i strategie, Warszawa 2006, p. 410.
 76 Idem, Kulturowe czynniki bezpieczeństwa, Kraków 2008, p. 30.
 77 The Mexico City declaration on cultural policies, [Paris] 1983, no. 1.
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civilization and thus it adopted another document on 20 October 2005 in Paris, 
i.e. The convention for the safeguarding of the intangible cultural heritage. The 
objective of that agreement is to develop interaction between cultures that serves 
building bridges between nations, to emphasize the liaisons between cultures 
and the development of all countries in the spirit of solidarity and partner-
ship, confirmation of the sovereign right of the countries to apply, adopt and 
implement policies and means which they consider suitable for protection and 
promotion of the diversity of the forms of cultural expression in their territory. 
This Convention has been incorporated into the Polish legislation78.
It is difficult to argue with the principle that the global society is slowly 
becoming a reality79. Because of that fact, will we witness gradual decline of 
national cultures and maybe of the nation states such as we have known so 
far? If from the time of establishment of first states we were ready for sacrifice 
in order to retain their cultural identity and political continuity, then will we 
in future deal mainly with economic issues and the real “end of history” will 
occur?80 Are we then on the verge of a new form of civilization which will not 
only save the most precious from the past structures but will also reach the 
level exceeding the most daring dreams of the utopians?81
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Abstrakt
Sposoby kształtowania bezpieczeństwa kulturowego państw narodowych
Każda władza państwowa prowadzi politykę kulturalną w interesie własnego bez-
pieczeństwa. Jej celem jest konsolidacja społeczeństwa wokół indywidualnych 
wartości duchowych. Należą do nich normy i wierzenia, przekazy historyczne 
i wytwory artystyczne. Są one celowo utrwalane i modelowane, aby zostały uznane 
przez naród za własne. Z założenia mają one stanowić o jego odrębności, poczuciu 
więzi wewnętrznej i tożsamości. Chodzi o stworzenie silnego przekonania, że „my” 
jesteśmy inni, nierzadko lepsi od obcego poczucia „oni”. Wszelkie ceremoniały 
służą internalizacji władzy, czyli wchłaniania jej przez jednostkę zdominowaną, 
która zaczyna być jej tragarzem. Samoczynnie dokonuje autocenzury, powstrzy-
muje się od protestów, kontestacji, buntu, akceptując zastany porządek. W dalszej 
części autor artykułu opisuje problem „skrzywdzonych Niemiec”, które tylko siłą są 
w stanie przywrócić należne im miejsce w świecie. Odnosi się także do rosyjskich 
kompleksów narodowych, poczucia misji dziejowej w czasach prawosławia i mark-
sizmu. W przypadku USA opisywany jest mit narodu wybranego przez Boga i jego 
szczególna misja w świecie. Największym zagrożeniem dla tradycyjnego państwa 
narodowego jest kultura masowa, która stopniowo zaciera indywidualne różnice 
między ludźmi na całym świecie, dążąc do jego ujednolicenia.
Słowa kluczowe: bezpieczeństwo kulturowe, państwo narodowe, wartości 
duchowe, odrębność, tożsamość, kultura masowa
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Abstract
Methods of forming cultural safety of nation states
Each state authority carries out a cultural policy in the interest of their own security. 
Its objective is to consolidate the society around individual spiritual values. They 
include norms and beliefs, historical accounts and works of art. They are intention-
ally retained and modeled, so that the nation regards them their own. By assumption 
they are to decide about the nation’s identity, about the feeling of internal bond 
and identity. The purpose is to create a strong feeling that “we” are different, very 
often better than the strange and foreign feeling of “them”. Any formalities serve 
internalization of authority, or absorbing it by the dominated individual who starts 
to be its porter. They execute a self-censorship, refrain from protests, contestation, 
rebellion, accept the existing order. Further in the article the author describes the 
problem of the “wronged Germany”, who can only forcefully recover their due posi-
tion in the world. He also relates to the Russian national complexes, the sense of 
historic mission in the times of Orthodox church and Marxism. In the case of the 
USA a description is given of a nation chosen by God and the Americans’ special 
mission in the world. The biggest threat for a traditional national state is the mass 
culture which gradually blurs the individual differences between people around 
the world, aiming at its uniformity.
Key words: cultural security, national state, spiritual values, difference, identity, 
mass culture
